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Abstract 
Feelings of attitudinal ambivalence (subjective ambivalence) are important because they predict 
key consequences of attitudes (e.g., attitude-behavior correspondence, attitude stability).  
However, the field’s understanding of the antecedents of subjective ambivalence is still 
developing.  We explore a previously unexamined antecedent of subjective ambivalence.  
Specifically, we examined discrepancies between participants’ actual attitudes and their desired 
attitudes as antecedents of subjective ambivalence and ambivalence consequences.  Six studies 
using a variety of attitude objects were conducted to test these ideas.  The first four studies 
demonstrated that actual-desired attitude discrepancies predicted subjective ambivalence over its 
previously documented antecedents.  Critically, two additional studies showed that actual-desired 
attitude discrepancies predicted important consequences of ambivalence.  As actual-desired 
attitude discrepancies increased, participants’ attitude-behavior correspondence decreased (Study 
5), and desire to reduce attitudinal conflict increased (Study 6).  Process data in these latter 
studies revealed indirect effects through subjective ambivalence that held after controlling for the 
objective presence of evaluative conflict.   
Keywords: attitudes, ambivalence, self-discrepancies, psychological conflict, attitude strength 
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Wanting Other Attitudes: 
Actual-Desired Attitude Discrepancies Predict Feelings of Ambivalence and Ambivalence 
Consequences 
People frequently experience evaluative conflict, or the simultaneous presence of positive 
and negative reactions towards the same object (e.g., de Liver, van der Pligt, & Wigboldus, 
2007; Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Rosenzweig, 1938; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 
1995).  One can love the taste of chocolate cake, but hate the calories; approve of a political 
candidate’s foreign policy stances, but disapprove of his or her environmental policies; or have 
conflicting feelings (e.g., joy and anxiety) about a new romance.  The term ambivalence broadly 
refers to these mixed evaluative reactions whether they stem from explicit or implicit 
discrepancies (Petty & Briñol, 2009).  People can be ambivalent about a wide variety of topics 
(e.g., abortion, career choices) and domains (e.g., health, race, self), and the study of 
ambivalence has therefore interested scholars in psychology (Conner & Armitage, 2008; van 
Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009), political science (Lavine, 2001; Rudolph & Popp, 
2007), sociology (Hajda, 1968), and other related disciplines (e.g., Otnes, Lowrey, & Shrum, 
1997) for decades.   
Ambivalence is often experienced as an unpleasant state that results in negative affect 
and psychologically undesirable outcomes (e.g., Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, 
Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Newcomb, 1968; Osgood & 
Tannenbaum, 1955; Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008).  Understanding ambivalence is 
critically important for understanding attitudes.  For example, the more ambivalence one 
experiences regarding an object, the less functional one’s attitude becomes in orienting one’s 
behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2000; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004).  Consistent with this 
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idea, people with ambivalent (versus univalent) attitudes tend to be slower to report their 
attitudes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992), are more sensitive to context effects in 
attitude expression (Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, & D'Andrade, 1989), and are less extreme 
in their evaluations (Kaplan, 1972).  Because ambivalence tends to be a negative state, people 
often attempt to reduce it.  For example, the motivation to reduce ambivalence leads people to 
pay careful attention to information that might help them resolve their ambivalence (e.g., Briñol, 
Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996; Rydell et 
al., 2008).1   
Two related but distinct ambivalence constructs have been identified in prior work: 
objective ambivalence and subjective ambivalence.  Objective ambivalence represents the actual 
presence of conflicting evaluative reactions within a given person (i.e., having both positive and 
negative reactions towards the same object).  Subjective ambivalence represents the experience 
of evaluative conflict, including a sense of being conflicted, confused, torn, and mixed with 
regard to the attitude object (Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995; van Harreveld et al., 
2009).   Subjective ambivalence can have cognitive (mixed reactions), affective (feeling 
conflicted), or behavioral (indecision) manifestations (Priester & Petty, 1996).   
Subjective ambivalence is hypothesized to be the psychological driver of many of the 
outcomes discussed above and is typically seen as the “gold standard” measure in research on 
ambivalence (e.g., Thompson et al., 1995).  Because of the psychological importance of 
subjective ambivalence, it is vital to understand its antecedents.   Research on ambivalence often 
only measures objective ambivalence (for  exceptions, see e.g., Haddock, 2003; Priester & Petty, 
1996, 2001), but researchers typically assume that objective ambivalence leads to subjective 
ambivalence (e.g., Maio et al., 1996).  As described next, however, objective ambivalence is an 
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inadequate predictor of subjective ambivalence. The present research builds on prior studies by 
proposing a previously unidentified antecedent of subjective ambivalence – discrepancies 
between a person’s actual evaluation and their desired evaluation of an attitude object. 
Furthermore, whereas past research often only assumes that ambivalence-related consequences 
are due to the experience of conflict (i.e., subjective ambivalence), we sought to empirically test 
this assumption with respect to actual-desired attitude discrepancies. 
Predictors of Subjective Ambivalence 
Many attitude objects are best characterized as linked to separable positive and negative 
reactions (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007), and 
this idea is central to many perspectives on ambivalence. Kaplan (1972) was the first to 
recommend what has become the most popular objective assessment of ambivalence, which 
involves separating a traditional bipolar scale into two unipolar scales (e.g., not at all favorable to 
extremely favorable and not at all unfavorable to extremely unfavorable; for an alternate strategy 
see Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2009).  In early research on ambivalence, 
researchers assumed that objective ambivalence invariably led to feelings of conflict regarding 
the attitude. They soon discovered that this was not always the case.   
Several researchers developed mathematical formulae to predict how conflicted a person 
would feel based on their positive and negative unipolar attitude reports.  To facilitate 
comparison among the various ambivalence theories that have developed over the years, Priester 
and Petty (1996) redefined the prevailing ambivalence formulae in terms of “dominant” reactions 
(D; the greater of the separate positive and negative evaluations) and “conflicting” reactions (C; 
the lesser of the two evaluations regardless of valence; cf., Scott, 1969).  In this framework, 
Kaplan’s formula reduces to expressing ambivalence simply as the magnitude of the conflicting 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  6 
 
reactions (C).  Subsequent formulae became more complex (e.g., C × D; Katz & Hass, 1988; see 
also Thompson et al., 1995). Initial efforts to relate objective to subjective ambivalence showed 
that regardless of the specific ambivalence formula used, dominant and conflicting reactions 
consistently predicted subjective ambivalence only to a moderate degree (e.g., rs = .36 to .52 in 
Priester & Petty, 1996).  That is, even the best formulae for objective ambivalence only predict 
about 27% of the variance in subjective ambivalence! This finding suggests that there are likely 
other determinants of subjective ambivalence besides the extent of dominant and conflicting 
reactions personally endorsed.   
Individual and situational factors account for some variation in the strength of the 
relationship between objective and subjective ambivalence.  For example, people high in 
preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995) show a stronger objective-
subjective ambivalence relationship (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).  In addition, this relationship 
becomes stronger as both the dominant and conflicting reactions become more accessible 
(Newby-Clark et al., 2002) or are held with an equal degree of certainty (Briñol, Petty, & 
DeMarree, 2008), as well as when a decision regarding the attitude object is imminent (van 
Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009; van Harreveld, van der Pligt et 
al., 2009).  Again, however, the modest relationship under even the most favorable conditions 
suggests that researchers have not yet accounted for all of the determinants of subjective 
ambivalence.  
Psychologists have also begun to identify additional antecedents of subjective 
ambivalence other than objective conflict between the individual’s positive and negative 
reactions.  Most notably, interpersonal ambivalence, the possession of attitudes that differ from 
those that close others are perceived to have, predicts subjective ambivalence over and above 
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objective ambivalence, as least so long as the close others are liked (Priester & Petty, 2001).  
Similarly, anticipating the existence of unknown, attitude incongruent information can also lead 
to feelings of conflict (Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007).  The current research sought to extend the 
bases of subjective ambivalence to include another form of intrapsychic conflict – between 
individuals’ actual current attitudes and the attitudes they would like to possess.  We describe the 
relevant concepts and rationale for this prediction next. 
Desired Attitudes 
Just as one’s perceptions of one’s own characteristics and accomplishments (actual self) 
can differ from the perceptions one wants to have (i.e., desired self; see Higgins, 1987, 1989; 
Markus & Nurius, 1986), the attitudes one holds toward a wide variety of objects, issues, or other 
people can be different from the attitudes one would like to possess.  For example, a shopper 
might want to like an unavailable option less and an available option more, whereas an 
environmentalist might want to like gas-guzzling SUVs less and bicycling more.  In a recent, 
relevant review, Maio and Thomas (2007) suggested that people sometimes have discrepancies 
between actual and desired opinions.  Citing research on relationships (i.e., attitudes towards 
one’s romantic partner) and the self (i.e., self-esteem regulation), Maio and Thomas argue that 
these discrepancies are important in the regulation of attitudes, and that people engage in a great 
deal of mental gymnastics to bring about their desired attitudes (e.g., self-persuasion). 
The key goal of the current research is to examine the possibility that discrepancies 
between actual and desired attitudes could be a previously unidentified source of evaluative 
conflict, and therefore might account for some of the unexplained variance repeatedly observed 
in subjective ambivalence research. Actual and desired attitudes, if discrepant, can have differing 
implications for a person’s behavior and thought (e.g., if one’s actual attitude pushes one towards 
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eating a piece of cake whereas one’s desired attitude, pushes one towards rejecting the cake), 
leading this person to experience the indecision and conflict characteristic of subjective 
ambivalence.  Critically, no prior research has explicitly examined whether discrepancies 
between actual and desired attitudes produce feelings of evaluative conflict (i.e., subjective 
ambivalence).   
The Present Research 
In sum, the primary goals of the present research are to (a) examine whether actual-
desired attitude discrepancies exist across a diversity of topics and if so, will lead people to 
experience evaluative conflict (i.e., subjective ambivalence) not accounted for by other known 
antecedents, and (b) investigate whether that conflict is consequential.  To address the latter, we 
examined downstream consequences that one would expect if actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies produce evaluative conflict (i.e., reduced attitude-behavior intention 
correspondence Study 5; increased information interest, Study 6).  Our studies examined a wide 
variety of attitude objects and used different assessment strategies and procedural variations to 
demonstrate the robustness of these findings.  In all studies, we tested actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies against objective ambivalence (as well as interpersonal ambivalence, Study 4), to 
see if these discrepancies predicted unique variance in subjective ambivalence and ambivalence 
consequences.   
Study 1 
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that actual-desired attitude discrepancies contribute to 
subjective ambivalence beyond objective ambivalence.  In this study, participants completed 
standard measures of attitudes, objective ambivalence, and subjective ambivalence with respect 
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to the topic of exercising, as well as additional questions designed to assess actual-desired 
attitude discrepancies.   
Method 
Participants.  One hundred-thirty-three Stanford University students (55 male, 75 
female, 3 unidentified; Mage = 20.0, SD = 1.7) participated in this study as part of a mass testing 
session.  The materials were included as part of a packet containing other unrelated studies. 
Procedure.  Participants were informed that they would be responding to an opinion 
survey.  Participants first reported their global attitude towards exercising and then indicated 
whether they desired to possess a different attitude.  Finally, participants reported their objective 
and subjective ambivalence towards exercising.  Participants completed materials in the order 
presented below. 
Materials. 
Attitudes.  Participants first indicated their attitudes toward exercise on a single 9-point 
semantic differential scale anchored by 1 (negative) and 9 (positive) (M = 7.55, SD = 1.61).  
Actual-desired discrepancy.  Immediately after reporting their attitudes, participants 
indicated whether they wanted to possess an attitude that differed from the one they reported.  
Specifically, instructions stated: 
You just indicated your attitude toward exercising.  Sometimes the attitudes we 
report are different from the attitudes we would like to hold.  For example, 
someone might want to be slightly more positive toward an issue that they are 
already positive about, while someone else might want to have a negative opinion 
when they currently have a positive one.  Other people do not have discrepancies 
such as these.  For the topic of exercising, is the attitude you indicated the same or 
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different from the attitude you would like to have?  Even small differences are 
important.   
Participants then indicated whether the attitude they reported was the same or different from their 
desired attitude.   If they reported wanting a different attitude (n = 67, 50%), they were then 
asked whether they wanted to be more positive (n = 65) or more negative (n = 2) towards 
exercising.  Finally, these participants were asked how much more [positive or negative] they 
wanted to be on a scale ranging from 1 (slightly) to 9 (extremely).  This final item served as our 
measure of actual-desired discrepancy magnitude (participants reporting no discrepancy were 
coded as 0 on this variable; M = 1.35, SD = 1.59). 
Objective ambivalence.  To assess objective ambivalence, we asked participants two 
questions separately assessing their positive and negative reactions towards exercising.  For the 
positive reactions, participants were asked “Considering only the positive qualities of exercise 
and ignoring the negative ones, how positive would you say your thoughts and feelings toward 
exercise are?” Participants reported their answers on a scale ranging from 0 (No positive thoughts 
or feelings) to 8 (Maximum positive thoughts or feelings).  A comparable question was employed 
to assess negative reactions.  We computed ambivalence using the most commonly employed 
ambivalence formula, initially recommended by Thompson and colleagues (1995).  Specifically, 
we calculated ambivalence by subtracting the absolute value of the difference between the 
positive (P) and negative (N) responses from the average of the two responses (i.e., (P + N) / 2 - 
|P – N|).  This index is maximized when people have equally and highly intense positive and 
negative reactions to an object.  In terms of conflicting (C) and dominant (D) reactions, this 
formula translates into ½(3C – D) (Priester & Petty, 1996).  Higher scores on this measure 
indicated higher levels of objective-ambivalence (M = .20; SD = 3.01).2  
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Subjective ambivalence.  Following previous research (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1996), we 
assessed subjective ambivalence by directly asking participants to report, using 9-point scales 
anchored at not at all and very much, the degree to which they felt indecision, confusion, or 
conflict in their opinion of exercising.  These three items were strongly related (alpha = .85) and 
thus were averaged to form an index of subjective ambivalence (M = 3.53; SD = 2.06). 
Results 
Analyses for this study were conducted using regression.  Subjective ambivalence was 
predicted from objective ambivalence and the magnitude of actual-desired discrepancy.  This 
analysis revealed two main effects, with both objective ambivalence (b = .17, SE = .051), t(130) 
= 3.26, p = .001, and the magnitude of actual-desired discrepancies (b = .58, SE = .097), t(130) = 
6.01, p < .001, strongly predicting subjective ambivalence in the expected direction (i.e., more 
objective ambivalence and larger discrepancies associated with more subjective ambivalence).  
Because discrepancies were primarily unidirectional (i.e., participants wanted to be more positive 
than they actually were), we did not examine direction as a potential moderator of these effects. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided the first evidence that discrepancies between one’s current attitude and 
a desired attitude can contribute to feelings of ambivalence.  As the magnitude of actual-desired 
attitude discrepancies towards exercising increased, so too did participants’ reports of subjective 
ambivalence.  Notably, this effect was significant after controlling for objective ambivalence. 
Thus, actual-desired attitude discrepancies add to our ability to predict subjective ambivalence, at 
least for the topic of exercising.  One goal of Study 2 is to generalize our findings across a wider 
range of attitude objects.  As such, each participant responded to measures on ten different 
attitude objects.  One advantage of having participants respond to so many attitude objects it that 
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it provides for increased power to explore the nature of the relationships between actual-desired 
attitude discrepancies and subjective ambivalence. 
In Study 2, we also shifted our assessment strategy.  Self-discrepancy theory (e.g., 
Higgins, 1987, 1989) holds that people can conceptualize their self-views in different ways.  
Specifically, Higgins (1987; 1989) distinguishes between a person’s actual self-views and two 
different types of desired selves – their ideal and ought self-views.  A person’s ideal self is the 
self one aspires to be, and represents one’s hopes and dreams.  A person’s ought self is the self 
one feels obligated to be, and represents one’s duties and things one “should” be.  Either of these 
are possible ways to frame one’s desired attitudes, so we chose to measure both ideal and ought 
forms of desired attitudes in order to more fully capture the ways in which participants might 
think about them.  
Study 2 
The goals of Study 2 were to provide a replication and extension of Study 1.  As noted 
above, in this study, we broadened our measurement of desired attitudes, and measured our 
variables with respect to multiple (ten) attitude objects within the same sample, which 
dramatically increased our statistical power as well as the generalizability of our findings.  
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and five Ohio State University undergraduates (51 male, 54 
female) participated for course credit.  
Procedure.  Participants were informed that they would be completing an opinion 
survey.  The survey included assessments of actual, ideal, and ought attitudes, objective 
ambivalence, and subjective ambivalence towards 10 different attitude objects. The order of 
attitude objects was randomized for each participant, but within each attitude object, the 
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measures appeared in the order described below.  The attitude objects used in this study were 
African Americans, Hillary Clinton, John McCain, abortion, exercising, gay marriage, the war in 
Iraq, the self, using condoms, and Wal-Mart.  
Materials.   
Objective and Subjective Ambivalence.  Objective and subjective ambivalence measures 
mirrored those described in Study 1. 
Actual and desired attitudes.  For the current set of studies, we modified questions used 
to assess self-guides for the purpose of assessing actual and desired attitudes.  We began with 
this prompt: 
Sometimes the attitudes we have are different from the attitudes we ideally would like to 
have or the attitudes we feel we should hold, and sometimes these attitudes are the same.  
For your opinion of <issue>, please indicate the attitude you ACTUALLY have, the 
attitude you IDEALLY would like to have, and the attitude you feel you SHOULD or 
OUGHT to hold using the separate scales provided. 
The prompt made it explicit that not everyone would have discrepancies.  Participants 
were then given separate scales assessing each of these attitudes (actual followed by ought and 
then ideal attitudes).  Participants reported these responses on 9-point scales ranging from -4 
(negative) to +4 (positive).   
From these measures, we computed first averaged ideal and ought attitudes to form a 
“desired attitude” index and then computed actual-desired attitude discrepancies by taking the 
absolute value of the discrepancy between the actual and desired attitudes.3  From these 
measures, we also coded for the direction of discrepancies which refers to whether participants 
wanted to be more positive or negative than they currently were.  Although we only report 
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analyses for “desired” attitudes (i.e., the mean of ought and ideal attitude reports), separate 
analysis of these constructs produced the same results in this and in all other studies which 
employed this assessment strategy. 
Results 
For descriptive information and interrelationships between variables, see Tables 1-3.  To 
test our hypotheses, we utilized a series of multilevel models.  Multilevel modeling is ideal for 
our data structure because we had ten attitude objects nested in each of our 105 participants.  
Multilevel modeling accounts for the non-independence of the multiple responses from a given 
participant (Hayes, 2006; Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002).  Taking into account 
the nesting of observations within individuals also allows us to compute accurate degrees of 
freedom (which can vary from test to test) and to partition out between-participant error 
variance.  We used measures of objective ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancy to 
predict subjective ambivalence.  Multilevel modeling generates coefficients for each predictor, 
which are comparable to unstandardized betas in regression.  We allowed intercepts to vary 
between participants but we fixed the slopes across participants.  Allowing slopes to vary across 
participants did not alter the results, and because the fixed slopes models were more 
parsimonious, we report them below.  In each of our analyses, we predicted the dependent 
variables from grand mean-centered predictors (Hayes, 2006).  
Between-participant variability.  We first predicted a null model with only an intercept 
term to calculate the interclass correlation (ICC), an index of the extent of variability in the 
dependent variable (subjective ambivalence) that is due to between-participant variability.  With 
an ICC of .126, 12.6% of the variability in subjective ambivalence is due to variation in overall 
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levels of subjective ambivalence across people.  This is consistent with research suggesting that 
some people are generally more ambivalent than others (e.g., Thompson & Zanna, 1995).   
Discrepancy analyses.  For our primary analyses, we predicted subjective ambivalence 
from attitude object, objective ambivalence, and actual-desired attitude discrepancies. There 
were main effects of attitude object, F(9, 936) = 11.46, p < .001 (e.g., people tended to be least 
ambivalent about Wal-Mart and the most about the war in Iraq), objective ambivalence (b = .32, 
SE = .020), t(1037) = 15.99, p < .001, and actual-desired attitude discrepancies (b = .37, SE = 
.048), t(1035) = 7.82, p < .001.  Replicating Study 1, the main effects of objective ambivalence 
and actual-desired attitude discrepancies were in the expected direction.   
We also conducted a follow-up analysis in which we coded for the direction of actual-
desired attitude discrepancies (i.e., whether desired attitudes were more positive or more 
negative than actual attitudes) and entered it, along with the interaction of discrepancy magnitude 
and discrepancy direction into the above analysis.  This analysis replicated the above effects, and 
did not produce any effects involving discrepancy (ts < 1), indicating that the magnitude, but not 
the direction of discrepancies appears to be most critical in predicting subjective ambivalence.   
Actual and desired analyses.  A number of methodologists have noted problems with an 
overreliance on difference scores to represent psychological (in)congruence (e.g., Edwards, 
1994).  To address potential concerns with our reliance on this approach, in this large data set, 
we also conducted analyses treating actual and desired attitudes as separate, interacting 
predictors. For these analyses, we predicted subjective ambivalence from attitude object, 
objective ambivalence, actual attitudes, desired attitudes, and the interaction of actual and 
desired attitudes. Replicating the above analyses, there were main effects of attitude object, F(9, 
940) = 9.93, p < .001, and objective ambivalence (b = .22, SE = .022), t(1035) = 9.92, p < .001.  
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There were also main effects of actual attitudes (b = -.18, SE = .038), t(1010) = 4.63, p < .001, 
and desired attitudes (b = -.15, SE = .048), t(1022) = 3.14, p < .01.  Critically, the Actual × 
Desired interaction also emerged (b = -.13, SE = .011), t(1028) = 11.70, p < .001 (see Figure 1).  
Decomposing this interaction at +/-1 standard deviation from the sample mean of actual attitude 
reveals a significant positive effect of desired attitude among people with negative actual 
attitudes (b = .20, SE = .043), t(1017) = 4.79, p < .001, but a significant negative effect of desired 
attitude among people with positive actual attitudes (b = -.51, SE = .068), t(1026) = 7.49, p < 
.001.  Consistent with predictions, subjective ambivalence is greatest with the combinations of 
actual and desired attitudes most associated with discrepancies (i.e., high/low, low/high).   
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the effects of Study 1 with a wide range of attitude objects, including 
political issues, behaviors, social groups, companies, and the self. In addition to replicating 
Experiment 1, this study presents a number of advances.  First, we expanded our 
operationalization of desired attitudes to include both ideal and ought attitudes.  Research on 
self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) argues that people can conceptualize their goals (i.e., 
self-standards) either in terms of ideals or oughts.  By measuring both, this study may more fully 
capture the ways in which people frame their attitudes.  Interestingly, these two desired attitudes, 
and their average, revealed nearly identical effects.  Furthermore, with the additional power 
afforded by this study, we examined the effects using different analytic approaches, including 
computing an actual-desired discrepancy index and treating actual and desired attitudes as 
separate, interacting constructs.  Both approaches were consistent with our predictions.   
Thus far we have not examined whether actual-desired attitude discrepancies predict 
subjective ambivalence over another known antecedent to which it is plausibly related: 
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interpersonal ambivalence.  Interpersonal ambivalence is important to rule out, because the 
attitudes of other people can be important guides to the “right” attitudes (e.g., Festinger, 1954), 
and as such, the attitudes of important others might be meaningful guides to our own desired 
attitudes.  However, our assumption is that people have their own reasons for wanting different 
attitudes (e.g., ideological consistency, self-improvement) which are often independent of what 
others want their attitudes to be.  If feedback from other people were the only source of actual-
desired attitude discrepancies, they would not be a novel, unique predictor of subjective 
ambivalence.  Thus, it is important to empirically establish the independence of interpersonal 
ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancies. 
Study 3 
Study 3 was designed primarily to rule out interpersonal ambivalence as fully accounting 
for the effects of actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  We conducted a conceptual replication of 
Study 2 using a target issue on which we expected a reliable effect of interpersonal ambivalence 
as a strong test of the independence of actual-desired discrepancies.   
Method 
Participants. Participants were 122 undergraduate students (77 female, 45 male) from 
Ohio State University who participated for partial course credit.  The materials for the current 
study were included as a filler questionnaire for an unrelated study.   
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Study 2, but featured a single attitude object 
(practicing safe sex) and the addition of the interpersonal ambivalence measure described below.   
Materials.   Materials were nearly identical to those used in Study 3 with the exception 
of a change in the attitude response scale (from anchors at +/-4 to a 1-9 scale; Mactual = 7.66, SD = 
1.89; Mdesired = 8.07, SD = 1.73; MSA = 2.70, SD = 1.83; MOA = 1.06, SD = 3.42) and the addition 
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of the interpersonal ambivalence measure.  We assessed interpersonal ambivalence towards the 
topic of practicing safe sex by asking participants to report the attitude of their current or most 
recent romantic partner MPartner = 7.37, SD = 2.04.  In a pilot test, participants indicated that 
disagreements with a romantic partner on the topic of practicing safe sex would bother them the 
most (M = 4.59 on a 7-point scale) compared with all other targets tested (e.g., parents, all Ms < 
3.8,  ps < .01).  As such, we selected this target person to provide maximum impact for the 
interpersonal ambivalence variable.  Interpersonal ambivalence was computed by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between a participant’s actual attitude and the perceived attitude 
of the relevant close other (Priester & Petty, 2001). 
Results and Discussion 
In addition to replicating Study 2, with both objective ambivalence (b = .10, SE = .045), 
t(118) = 2.20, p < .05, and actual-desired discrepancies (b = .46, SE = .15), t(118) = 3.07, p < .01, 
predicting subjective ambivalence, interpersonal ambivalence was also a significant predictor of 
subjective ambivalence (b = .24, SE = .12), t(118) = 2.05, p < .05.  That is, both objective 
ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancies continued to significantly predictor 
subjective ambivalence after controlling for interpersonal ambivalence.  Thus, it appears that 
actual-desired attitudes are not redundant with interpersonal ambivalence. Indeed, in this study, 
actual-desired attitude discrepancies predicted subjective ambivalence at least as well as the 
other predictors.  Further, direction of discrepancies did not produce a main effect or interact 
with discrepancy magnitude (ps > .35).4   
We also treated actual, desired, and partner attitudes as separate predictors, as in Study 2, 
and included the Actual Attitude × Desired Attitude and Actual Attitude × Partner Attitude 
interactions.  In these analyses, the interaction involving desired attitude was significant (b = -
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.166, SE = .036), t(115) = 4.55, p < .001, whereas the interaction involving partner was not, t < 1.  
The pattern of this interaction was the same as in Study 2, although as in Study 2, because the 
majority of people reported positive actual attitudes towards practicing safe sex, the effects of 
desired attitudes were most apparent among people whose actual attitudes were positive (because 
“low” values represented a relatively neutral evaluation rather than a negative evaluation).   
We should note that conflict with others is a plausible source of desired attitudes (see 
General Discussion for more information), and in our sample, interpersonal ambivalence was 
positively related to actual-desired attitude discrepancies (r = .38, p < .001).   Critically, 
however, these constructs are far from redundant, as both independently predicted subjective 
ambivalence in this study.   
Study 4 
So far, all of the data provided have been correlational.  Study 4 was designed to 
experimentally manipulate actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  After people reported their 
attitudes they received feedback indicating that people who possess their current evaluation or 
people who possess a different evaluation of a target issue tended to possess a number of 
desirable qualities.  Following the false feedback, participants completed measures of subjective 
and objective ambivalence as well as measures of their actual and desired attitudes. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 90 people living in the United States (39 male, 50 female, 
1 unidentified; Mage = 34.5, SD = 14.4) recruited using Mechanical Turk who were paid $.12 for 
participating (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).   
Procedure.  Participants first completed a series of personality questions (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and received personality feedback that was in part based on their 
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previous responses (e.g., regarding their extraversion & open-mindedness) and was in part 
ambiguous (e.g., Forer, 1949).  This sort of feedback is typically viewed as very self-diagnostic 
and was used to boost the credibility of our manipulated feedback.  All participants then read the 
same information about the potential benefits of taxing junk food (adapted from Clark et al., 
2006) and indicated their attitude towards taxing junk food.  We then gave them customized 
feedback that indicated that people who possessed their attitude or a dissimilar attitude possessed 
a number of positive characteristics.  Participants then completed measures of objective and 
subjective ambivalence and actual and desired attitudes. Finally, participants completed 
demographic measures and were debriefed.   
Materials.    
Discrepancy manipulation. After reading information about the possible benefits of a 
junk food tax (e.g., increased revenue, shift towards healthier food options; see Clark et al., 
2006) participants indicated their attitude towards taxing junk food.  They were then randomly 
assigned to receive feedback suggesting that their current attitude was desirable or that a 
different attitude was desirable.  This feedback was customized based on their responses to the 
earlier attitude questions (i.e., whether they reported support (n = 50), opposition (n = 32), or 
neutrality (n = 8)).  For example, the feedback that people in favor of a junk food tax received in 
the “desire a different attitude” condition stated: 
Based on the questions you completed, you support taxing junk food. In general, people 
who oppose (versus support) taxing junk food tend to be independent thinkers who do 
not blindly accept what others say without satisfactory proof. Furthermore, they tend to 
be good managers of their own lives, and can master skills that they are sufficiently 
interested in. 
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Participants in the discrepancy condition who had a neutral attitude received feedback 
indicating that people who had a strong opinion on the topic possessed these positive qualities.   
Dependent measure.  Immediately after this feedback, participants completed subjective 
ambivalence questions parallel to Study 1.   
Manipulation checks.  To ensure that the manipulation was effective, after the dependent 
measure, we included measures of actual and desired attitudes and objective ambivalence.  The 
objective ambivalence measure paralleled the one used in Study 1.   
The measure of discrepancies was similar to that used in Study 2. However, rather than 
reporting separate ideal and ought attitudes, participants were instead asked to report the attitude 
towards taxing junk food that they WANT TO have on a 9-point scale ranging from Extremely 
Negative to Extremely Positive.  The actual attitude measure always appeared first.  Discrepancy 
scores were computed in the same manner as in the prior studies.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks.  Actual-desired attitude discrepancies and objective ambivalence 
were submitted to a 2 (Feedback type: desire same vs. desire different) × 3 (Feedback 
customization: initial report of support, opposition, or neutrality) ANOVAs.  The only effect to 
emerge was the predicted effect of the feedback type on actual-desired attitude discrepancies, 
F(1, 84) = 5.58, p = .02, such that larger discrepancies were observed in the desire different 
condition (M = 1.61, SE = .28) than in the desire same condition (M = .59, SE = .33). No effects 
emerged on objective ambivalence (Fs < 1.42, ps > .24). 
Subjective ambivalence.  Subjective ambivalence was also submitted to the above 
ANOVA.  The predicted effect of the feedback type on subjective ambivalence emerged, F(1, 
84) = 6.51, p = .01, such greater subjective ambivalence was observed in the desire different 
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condition (M = 3.60, SE = .36) than in the desire same condition (M = 2.18, SE = .42). There was 
also a marginal effect of feedback customization F(1, 84) = 2.74, p = .07, such that people whose 
attitudes were initially negative (M = 2.21, SE = .36) tended to experience less ambivalence than 
people with initial positive (M = 3.22, SE = .18) or neutral attitudes (M = 3.23, SE = .71). 
Mediation.  To determine whether the effect of our manipulation on subjective 
ambivalence was mediated by the change in actual-desired attitude discrepancies, we used 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro for estimating indirect effects (see also Shrout 
& Bolger, 2002).  We ran this model with objective ambivalence as a covariate, though the same 
effects were observed when the covariate was not included.  The INDIRECT macro for SPSS 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed a significant total effect of condition on subjective 
ambivalence (b = 1.04), t = 2.64, p < .01.  The main effect of condition remained significant 
when accounting for the effect of actual-desired discrepancies (b = .83), t = 2.11, p < .05. 
Critically, however, the indirect effect through subjective ambivalence was present (.21) and the 
bias corrected confidence interval did not contain 0, indicating a significant indirect effect of 
condition through actual-desired discrepancies (.021, .61), consistent with partial mediation.  In 
addition, objective ambivalence was a significant covariate (b = .14), t = 3.81, p < .001.   
Discussion 
In Study 4, we manipulated actual-desired attitude discrepancies by giving feedback that 
participants’ current attitudes were desirable or undesirable to establish the causal role that these 
discrepancies have in predicting subjective ambivalence.  Consistent with the correlational data 
already presented, when people learned that another attitude was more desirable than their 
current attitude they reported larger actual-desired attitude discrepancies and evidenced increased 
feelings of conflict, relative to people who were not told that their existing attitude was desirable.   
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Furthermore, the mediational data are consistent with the notion that the impact of our 
induction was driven at least in part by shifts in actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  However, 
the reverse mediational pathway – that subjective ambivalence could lead people to desire 
different attitudes (see e.g., van Harreveld et al., 2009) – is also plausible.  When we tested this 
reverse indirect effect, it was also different from 0 (.21, CI: .031, .59) and was of similar 
magnitude to the predicted mediational pathway. Thus, the true causal path is unclear in the 
present study.  We should note, however, that Studies 5 and 6 did not find this reverse pattern of 
mediation, so we do not think that the reverse causal path is wholly responsible for the 
relationships observed in this paper. 
To this point, we have demonstrated that actual-desired attitude discrepancies predict 
feelings of ambivalence, and do so across a wide range of attitude objects and over other 
documented predictors of subjective ambivalence.  We have not, however, demonstrated that the 
ambivalence that stems from actual-desired attitude discrepancies is meaningful in any way.  
This is the goal of Studies 5 and 6. 
Study 5 
In Study 5, we examined an important potential consequence of actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies—moderation of attitude prediction of behavioral intentions.  This consequence 
was chosen because the prediction of behavior is one of the central goals of attitudes research 
(e.g., Fazio & Olson, in press), and because unambivalent attitudes in particular are better 
predictors of behavior than are ambivalent attitudes (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000). We 
assessed actual and desired attitudes, objective and subjective ambivalence, and intentions to 
exercise.  We predicted that those with larger actual-desired attitude discrepancies would have 
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lower prediction of behavioral intentions from their attitudes, controlling for objective 
ambivalence, and that this effect would be mediated by subjective ambivalence. 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred forty Stanford University students and staff (57 male, 79 
female, 4 declined to state) participated as part of a paid mass testing session.  
Procedure.  Participants completed an opinion survey about exercise.  Participants 
reported their actual and desired attitudes, objective and subjective ambivalence, and their 
intentions to exercise during the next week.  Materials below are presented in the order 
completed by participants, with the exception that some participants reported their behavioral 
intentions prior to completing the other measures and other participants reported their behavioral 
intentions after completing the other measures.  This order manipulation did not moderate any of 
the analyses reported below and hence is not discussed further.  Three participants declined to 
report their exercise attitudes, and two additional participants declined to report their behavioral 
intentions.  All of the analyses reported below exclude these participants, leaving 135 
participants in the sample, although the patterns of significance do not differ when these 
participants are included in the analyses that do not require these variables. 
Materials. 
Attitudes.  Participants reported their attitudes on a single semantic differential scale 
anchored by 1 (negative) and 9 (positive) (M = 7.59, SD = 1.52).  
Actual-desired discrepancy.  Actual-desired attitude discrepancies were measured and 
computed in the same manner as in Study 1 (i.e., discrepancy is the extent participants wanted 
their attitudes to be more positive or negative than their actual attitudes).  Thirty-nine 
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participants (29%) reported wanting a different attitude, and all but two of them wished for their 
attitude to be more positive (discrepancy magnitude M = .95, SD = 1.35).   
Objective and Subjective Ambivalence.  Objective (M = 1.20, SD = 2.69) and subjective 
(M = 3.43, SD = 1.85) ambivalence measures were the same as those described in Study 1. 
Behavioral intentions.  Participants reported how many days they intended to exercise in 
the next week (M = 3.47, SD = 1.91). 
Results 
Subjective ambivalence.  Paralleling our previous studies, both objective ambivalence (b 
= .20), t(133) = 3.50, p = .001, and the magnitude of actual-desired discrepancies (b = .29), 
t(133) = 2.58, p = .01, predicted subjective ambivalence in the expected direction (i.e., more 
objective ambivalence and larger discrepancies associated with more subjective ambivalence).  
Because only two people wanted more negative attitudes, we did not test for moderation of these 
effects by discrepancy direction. 
Behavioral intentions.  Recall our key prediction that actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies would reduce the extent to which attitudes predicted behavioral intentions.  To test 
this prediction, we regressed behavioral intentions on actual attitudes, attitude discrepancy 
magnitude, objective ambivalence, and the Actual Attitude × Discrepancy Magnitude and 
Actual Attitude × Objective Ambivalence interactions.  Following Cohen and Cohen (1983), 
main effects were interpreted on the first step of the regression, and interactions were interpreted 
on the second step of the regression. Actual exercise attitudes predicted intentions to exercise (b 
= .54), t(130) = 4.96, p < .001, as did objective ambivalence (b = -.11), t(130) = -1.98, p = .049.  
More important, the Actual Attitude × Discrepancy, (b = -.16), t(128) = -2.36, p = .02 and 
Actual Attitude × Objective Ambivalence interactions (b = -.07), t(128) = -2.29, p = .02, were 
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both significant in the expected direction (see Figure 2).  Both larger discrepancies and greater 
objective ambivalence decreased the prediction of behavioral intentions by actual attitudes. 
Mediation.  Both objective ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancies 
significantly predicted subjective ambivalence and moderated the attitude-behavioral intention 
relationship.  We next examined whether subjective ambivalence mediated the impact of these 
variables on the attitude-behavior relationship.  This is a case of mediated moderation.  To 
examine this relationship, we conducted a path analysis using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-
2011).  In this model, we predicted the mediator, subjective ambivalence, from objective 
ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  We then predicted behavioral intentions 
from attitude, objective ambivalence, actual-desired attitude discrepancies, subjective 
ambivalence, and the interactions of the latter three variables with attitude.   
In this model, both antecedents of subjective ambivalence were significant (ps < .05).  
Behavioral intentions were only significantly predicted by attitude (b = .60, boot-SE = .111, p < 
.001), subjective ambivalence (b = -.16, boot-SE = .074, p < .05), and Attitude × Subjective 
Ambivalence (b = -.10, boot-SE = .043, p < .05).  Critically, bootstrap confidence intervals for 
the indirect effect of objective ambivalence (estimate = -.020, 95% CI: -.049, -.004) and actual-
desired attitude discrepancies (estimate = -.029, 95% CI: -.076, -.004) through subjective 
ambivalence (interacting with attitude) did not contain 0, consistent with full mediation on both 
paths.  Furthermore, the confidence interval for the reverse indirect effect, with subjective 
ambivalence leading to actual-desired discrepancies, which then moderate the attitude-BI 
relationship, did contain 0, reducing the plausibility of this pathway driving the effects in the 
current study (estimate = -.005, 95% CI: -.041, .007).  We also tried a similar reverse mediational 
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pathway with objective ambivalence as the mediator, and again found no support for the reversed 
path (estimate = -.010, 95% CI: -.074, .007). 
Discussion 
Study 5 extends our earlier investigations by showing that the subjective ambivalence 
associated with actual-desired attitude discrepancies is consequential.  Specifically, attitudes 
toward exercise were less predictive of intentions to exercise among those with larger actual-
desired attitude discrepancies.  As with our earlier studies, this effect held after controlling for 
objective ambivalence.  Further, the moderation of the attitude-behavior relationship by desired 
attitude discrepancies was mediated by subjective ambivalence.   
In this data set, objective ambivalence also moderated the attitude-behavior intention 
relationship, and this relationship was also mediated by subjective ambivalence.  Although past 
research has shown such moderation by objective ambivalence (e.g., Armitage & Connor, 2000), 
and subjective ambivalence is hypothesized to be the mediating variable, to our knowledge, this 
is the first empirical demonstration of this mediation.   
In this study, we demonstrated that attitudes associated with actual-desired discrepancies 
are less functional in that they predict behavior less well than do attitudes with greater 
congruence.  Because ambivalent attitudes are less functional, people are motivated to reduce 
feelings of ambivalence, and will often do so by informational means (e.g., Bell & Esses, 2002).  
Because actual-desired attitude discrepancies are relatively novel antecedents of ambivalence, in 
Study 6 we sought to examine the extent to which the subjective ambivalence that emerges from 
these discrepancies is something participants are motivated to reduce. 
Study 6 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  28 
 
In Study 6, we sought to demonstrate that participants are motivated to reduce the 
conflict actual-desired attitude discrepancies create.  We did this by assessing participants’ desire 
to seek out additional information about the attitude object and to resolve their ambivalence 
(Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997).  Measures of information seeking are important because they 
have been found to predict actual information exposure and processing (Hart et al., 2009), and 
because they are informative about the extent to which participants want to do something about 
their conflicted feelings (Zhao & Cai, 2008). 
Method 
Participants.  Two hundred eighty-eight Texas Tech University undergraduates (83 
male, 205 female) participated for course credit.  
Procedure.  As filler measures for unrelated studies, participants were asked to complete 
an opinion survey in which they were asked a series of questions about abortion.  Participants 
reported their actual, ideal, and ought attitudes, objective and subjective ambivalence, and their 
interest in information that could reduce ambivalence.  Materials below are presented in the 
order completed by participants.   
Materials. 
Objective and Subjective Ambivalence.  Objective (M = .42, SD = 3.10) and subjective 
(M = 3.74, SD = 2.35) ambivalence measures were the same as those described in Study 1. 
Actual-desired discrepancy.  Actual-desired attitude discrepancies were measured and 
computed in the same manner as in Study 2 (i.e., desired attitude was the average of ideal and 
ought attitudes; discrepancy magnitude M = 1.27, SD = 1.57).   
Information interest.  Participants’ interest in attitude-relevant information and their 
desire to reduce their ambivalence were assessed with four items.  Specifically, participants were 
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asked “To what extent are you curious about legalized abortion?” “Would you like to know more 
about legalized abortion?” “How interested would you say you are in finding out more about 
legalized abortion?” and “To what extent would you like to do something to help resolve any 
potential mixed feelings towards legalized abortion?” Participants responded to these questions 
using 9-point scales anchored at not at all and very much. Responses were averaged (alpha = .89) 
to form an index of information interest (M = 3.94, SD = 2.12).  Interest and curiosity in learning 
more about the attitude object for which the discrepancy exists has been used as a subjective 
indicator of desire to reduce ambivalence (Zhao & Cai, 2008).  The perceptions that people have 
with regard to their need for further information have been shown to play an important role in 
decision making, information processing, and attitude change (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2012; Clark 
et al., 2008).  Another benefit of this measure is it allows us to see to what extent participants 
explicitly recognize that they want to do something about their ambivalence (see also Maio & 
Thomas, 2007).  Awareness of the need to receive further discrepancy-relevant information is 
likely a first step in many attempts to reduce feelings of conflict.  Also, although people might 
deal with their discrepancies in many other ways (e.g., ignoring, trivializing, changing 
attributions; Maio & Thomas, 2007), seeking relevant information might lead people to a more 
stable resolution of their discrepancies.  
Results 
Subjective ambivalence.  Paralleling our previous studies, both objective ambivalence (b 
= .34), t(285) = 9.41, p < .001 and the magnitude of actual-desired discrepancies (b = .50), t(285) 
= 7.02, p < .001, strongly predicted subjective ambivalence in the expected direction (i.e., more 
objective ambivalence and larger discrepancies associated with more subjective ambivalence).   
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In addition to the above analysis, we also conducted a supplemental analysis that 
included the direction of actual-desired attitudinal discrepancies (coded +1 for wanting to be 
more positive, -1 for wanting to be more negative, 0 for no discrepancy) as well as the 
Discrepancy Magnitude × Direction interaction.  This analysis reproduced the above effects, and 
also revealed a marginal trend for the effect of discrepancy magnitude to be stronger among 
people wanting to be more negative (b = .24), t(283) = 1.74, p = .083.  Because this effect was 
only marginal, and because this effect was not consistently obtained across data sets, we do not 
attempt to interpret it.   
Desire to reduce ambivalence.  We predicted participants’ desire to reduce their 
ambivalence from objective ambivalence and the magnitude of actual-desired attitude 
discrepancy.  This analysis revealed two main effects, with both objective ambivalence (b = .20), 
t(285) = 5.13, p < .001 and the magnitude of actual-desired discrepancies (b = .17), t(285) = 
2.17, p < .05 predicting desire to reduce ambivalence in the expected direction (i.e., more 
objective ambivalence and larger discrepancies associated with more desire to reduce 
ambivalence).  Supplemental analyses including discrepancy direction and its interaction with 
discrepancy magnitude did not alter the above results, nor did it qualify them.   
Mediation.  To determine whether the impact of actual-desired discrepancies and 
objective ambivalence on the desire to reduce ambivalence was mediated by subjective 
ambivalence, we tested a dual-predictor, single-mediator model using the INDIRECT macro for 
SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  This model revealed a significant effect of subjective 
ambivalence on desire to reduce ambivalence (b = .23), t = 3.67, p < .001, when controlling for 
actual-desired attitude discrepancies and objective ambivalence. 
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For objective ambivalence, the main effect of objective ambivalence remained significant 
when accounting for the effect of subjective ambivalence (b = .12), t = 2.79, p < .01. However, 
the indirect effect through subjective ambivalence was also present (.079) and the bias corrected 
confidence interval did not contain 0, indicating a significant indirect effect of objective 
ambivalence through subjective ambivalence (.033, .13).  However, when subjective 
ambivalence and objective ambivalence were switched in this analysis, the indirect effect 
remained significant (indirect effect = .086, boot-se = .035, 95%CI: .019, .158). 
For actual-desired attitude discrepancies, the main effect of actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies was no longer significant when accounting for the effect of subjective ambivalence 
(b = .05), t = .64, p = .53. Critically, however, the indirect effect through subjective ambivalence 
was present (.12), and the bias corrected confidence interval did not contain 0, indicating a 
significant indirect effect of actual-desired attitude discrepancies through subjective ambivalence 
(.053, .19).  When subjective ambivalence and actual-desired attitude discrepancies were 
switched in this analysis, the reverse pattern of mediation was not obtained (indirect effect = 
.015, 95%CI: -.032, .066).   Thus, both indirect effects through subjective ambivalence were 
significant, even when controlling for each other.  
Discussion 
Study 6 extends our earlier investigations by showing that the subjective ambivalence 
associated with actual-desired attitude discrepancies is consequential.  Specifically, people 
reported a greater desire to reduce conflict and to find out more about the attitude object as 
actual-desired attitude discrepancies increased.  As with our earlier studies, this effect held after 
controlling for objective ambivalence.  Further, the effect of actual-desired attitude discrepancies 
on the desire to reduce conflict was mediated by subjective ambivalence.   
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General Discussion 
Ambivalence is a central construct in the literature on attitudes, and it has been the focus 
of a recent resurgence in research interest (e.g., Cavazza & Butera, 2008; Clark et al., 2008; 
Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008; Cowley & Czellar, 2012; DeMarree, Morrison, Wheeler, & 
Petty, 2011; Hormes & Rozin, 2011; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Priester et al., 2007; 
Sawicki et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2013; van Harreveld, Rutjens, et al., 2009; van Harreveld, 
van der Pligt, et al., 2009; Ziegler, Schlett, Casel, & Diehl, 2012).  Although the subjective 
experience of conflict is important because it often drives ambivalence outcomes (e.g., attitude-
behavior correspondence, information seeking), there is a current gap in our understanding of the 
factors that contribute to this sense of conflict.  A key goal of the present research was to offer 
insight into a novel antecedent of subjective ambivalence: actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  
We examined this antecedent across six studies and a wide range of attitude issues.  In the 
context of doing this, we also provided evidence for an interesting phenomenon -- people often 
have attitudes that they wish were different. 
Although past theorists have speculated that people might desire different attitudes than 
the ones they hold toward a diversity of topics (Maio & Thomas, 2007), the current research is 
the first to provide direct evidence that, across a wide range of issues, they actually do.  
Furthermore, we showed that such discrepancies consistently predict subjective ambivalence and 
predict ambivalence-related outcomes.  We demonstrated prediction of subjective ambivalence 
across different attitude objects, operationalizations of desired attitudes, and after controlling for 
other documented antecedents of subjective ambivalence (i.e., objective ambivalence and 
interpersonal ambivalence).  
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Critically, the subjective ambivalence arising from actual-desired attitude discrepancies is 
consequential, in that people with larger discrepancies have less impactful (Study 5) attitudes and 
indicate a desire to find out more about the attitude object, presumably in an effort to reduce the 
conflict (Study 6).  These results are important in documenting a new antecedent of subjective 
ambivalence and of ambivalence-related consequences, but also have many other implications 
for the literature on attitudes, attitude change, attitude strength, and attitude regulation.  We 
outline some of these theoretical and practical implications below. 
Subjective Ambivalence 
As noted in the introduction, despite the hypothesized importance of subjective 
ambivalence in understanding a wide variety of attitude-related phenomenology, its antecedents 
are not well understood.  A consistent gap in researchers’ ability to predict subjective 
ambivalence is present, and the current research helps to narrow this gap.  We now know that 
actual-desired attitude discrepancies can predict subjective ambivalence over previously known 
predictors.  For example, across the object examined in Study 2, adding actual-desired 
discrepancies to regression models predicting subjective ambivalence accounted for more than 
6% more variance than models including objective ambivalence alone (adjusted R2 = .26 versus 
.32).  Furthermore, the ambivalence stemming from these discrepancies is consequential, as 
larger actual-desired attitude discrepancies reduced the predictive utility of attitudes and 
increased interest in attitude-relevant information. The current research builds on other recent 
work (e.g., van Harreveld et al., 2009) predicting that subjective ambivalence emerges when 
there are conflicting behavioral or cognitive implications of one’s attitude.  This can come from 
conflicting positive and negative associations, as in past research, or from conflicting actual and 
desired evaluations, at in the present research.  
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Interestingly, the current findings go beyond the contribution of understanding the origins 
of subjective ambivalence.  Although a great deal of research on ambivalence postulates that the 
effects of objective ambivalence are due to the subjective experience of conflict (e.g., Maio et al., 
1996), researchers have not tested this meditational pathway by including explicit measures of 
both objective and subjective ambivalence.  However, in Studies 5 and 6, we found significant 
indirect effects of objective ambivalence through subjective ambivalence on ambivalence-related 
outcomes.  We should note that not all effects of ambivalence are likely to be driven by the 
subjective experience of ambivalence, such as when a subtle situational induction might 
capitalize on a structural inconsistency (e.g., DeMarree et al., 2011).  But, for many effects of 
ambivalence, and in particular those that involve more thoughtful processes, subjective 
ambivalence is likely to be a proximal causal variable.   
Actual-desired Attitude Discrepancies 
One might wonder about the prevalence and nature of actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies.  The current data suggest that the prevalence of actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies varies across attitude objects.  In our samples, for some attitude objects, such as the 
self, discrepancies were relatively common, whereas for other attitude objects (e.g., practicing 
safe sex, gay marriage), they were less common.  Among our samples, actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies were relatively uniform in their direction for some attitude objects (e.g., these 
participants wanted to be more positive about the self, exercising, and African Americans, but 
more negative about Walmart) but more evenly distributed for others (e.g., John McCain, 
abortion).  Most dramatically, perhaps, as shown in Table 2, approximately half of the time, 
people wished they had a different attitude, which points to the widespread prevalence of actual-
desired attitude discrepancies and their potential importance in many situations. 
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Because of conversational norms, by asking separate questions for actual and desired 
attitudes, it is possible that participants felt we wanted them to report different answers for each 
question (see e.g., Schwarz, 1999).  We tried to avoid this by being explicit in our instructions 
that for some people actual, ideal, and ought attitudes would be different whereas for other 
people they would be the same, but it is still possible that this method of asking separate 
questions falsely increased the prevalence of discrepancies.  However, the reported discrepancies 
were not just “noise” — the magnitude of discrepancies strongly predicted subjective 
ambivalence regardless of how the discrepancies were assessed.  Further, for some objects (e.g., 
practicing safe sex in Study 4), the rates of participants reporting discrepancies was relatively 
low, providing some evidence against inflation in the number of participants reporting 
discrepancies solely due to factors such as conversational norms or demand characteristics.  
Origin of Discrepancies 
Another question concerns the origin of actual-desired attitude discrepancies. One 
possible origin is the higher order goals a person is pursuing.  For example, individuals who have 
a goal to lose weight might want to like exercising and vegetables more, but video games and 
chocolate cake less. Evidence indicates that the pursuit of goals can affect current evaluations 
(e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), so it seems plausible that they can also affect desired attitudes.  
That is, it is beneficial to goal pursuit if we like things that will facilitate goal attainment and 
dislike things that will impede goal attainment (for a related discussion, see Wheeler, Briñol, & 
Hermann, 2007).  Immediate shifts in our evaluations in response to our current goals (Ferguson 
& Bargh, 2004) might not always be possible, and such shifts might not occur as readily for 
long-term goals.  As such, goals could promote the formation of desired attitudes, and changing 
attitudes to make them less discrepant can presumably help people attain their goals.  
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However, goals are not the only source of actual-desired attitude discrepancies.  Desired 
attitudes could also originate from consistency motives.  People generally like to maintain 
consistency both within and between their evaluations (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). A person could 
want different attitudes in order to maintain consistency with a higher order ideological or 
evaluative structure.  For example, a Catholic might want to like birth control less, whereas a 
political liberal might want to like gay marriage more.  In addition, because interpersonal 
inconsistency is aversive (Priester & Petty, 2001), discrepancies between a person’s own opinion 
and the opinions of people they are close to or respect might motivate people to want different 
attitudes.  This might, in part, account for the opinion shifts that people experience when 
introduced to new social environments (e.g., Newcomb, 1961; see also Visser & Krosnick, 
1998).  Importantly, however, such interpersonal discrepancies are not likely the sole cause of 
actual-desired discrepancies as shown in Study 3. 
Attitude Regulation 
The current research showed that actual-desired attitude discrepancies increase subjective 
ambivalence and suggests that people chronically hold such discrepancies toward a variety of 
objects and issues.  This is notable in light of research showing that subjective ambivalence is 
aversive (Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006) and that people are motivated to 
reduce it (Bell & Esses, 2002; Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006).  This 
raises the possibility that people might want to regulate their attitudes in much the same way that 
they regulate other self-aspects.  However, unlike most research on ambivalence, this motivation 
should be directional (i.e., to move the actual attitude in the direction of the desired attitude; see 
Maio & Thomas, 2007).  
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Although most research on attitudinal ambivalence has not examined directional effects 
of ambivalence, a recent paper by Clark and colleagues (2008) is a notable exception.  In their 
research, people tended to think more carefully about information that would help resolve their 
ambivalence in the direction of their existing attitude (i.e., the direction of their dominant 
reactions towards the object).  This directionality was due to the perception that it would be 
easier to resolve the ambivalence in the direction of the dominant reactions than in the direction 
of the conflicting reactions (because more information would be needed to overcome the 
dominant reactions).  Thus this directional push is due to the ease of ambivalence reduction, not 
necessarily to a person desiring one attitude over the other.  Our research suggests that an 
examination of multiple motives underlying ambivalence reduction might be warranted.  When a 
person’s desired attitude is of the same valence but is more extreme than their actual attitude, 
ease of ambivalence reduction and attainment of desired attitudes both might “push” participants 
in the same direction.  However, when a person desires an attitude of a different valence, these 
factors will exert opposing influences.  It is also possible that conflicts such as these might shift 
individuals’ desired attitudes.   
Maio and Thomas (2007) proposed a number of strategies that individuals might use to 
obtain their desired opinion.  For example, people might generate arguments in favor of the 
desired position, reinterpret information that is inconsistent with the desired attitude, reduce the 
importance of this information, or even try to suppress it.  The strategies proposed by Maio and 
Thomas, however, are primarily intrapsychic strategies.  That is, they are strategies that occur 
entirely within the individual and involve manipulating pre-existing attitude-relevant knowledge.  
It is also possible that actual-desired attitude discrepancies could motivate behavior that would 
help obtain desired attitudes.  For example, a person who wants to like exercising more might 
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choose to exercise with a friend, thus increasing their enjoyment of exercising.  Similarly, a 
person who wants to oppose abortion might seek out information that would support this desired 
attitude (e.g., by visiting socially conservative websites).  In addition to seeking out desired 
attitude-supporting information, they might also process new information in a desired attitude-
supporting manner (e.g., by paying more attention to supporting than opposing information, by 
interpreting ambiguous information in a supporting manner).  Actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies could also motivate people to behave in accord with their desired attitudes (e.g., 
fake it until you make it, see also Willard & Gramzow, 2009) and against their current attitude 
(e.g., resulting in dissonance, Festinger, 1957).  Exploring the strategies by which people 
regulate their opinions would represent an important and interesting direction for future research. 
Attitude Strength 
Ambivalence is often negatively associated with the consequences of attitude strength 
(Petty & Krosnick, 1995).  Strong attitudes are those that resist change, are stable over time, and 
are predictive of behavior and information processing (Krosnick & Petty, 1995).  Attitudes that 
are low in ambivalence tend to exhibit strength consequences more than attitudes that are high in 
ambivalence (Conner & Armitage, 2008).  For example, as already noted, ambivalent attitudes 
are less predictive of behavior (e.g., Conner et al., 2002; Lavine, 2001) and more susceptible to 
change (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Bell & Esses, 2002; DeMarree et al., 2011).  A new 
question raised by the current research concerns the extent to which actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies are associated with strength consequences. Study 5 demonstrated that the attitudes 
of people without actual-desired attitude discrepancies are better predictors of behavior than the 
attitudes of people with such discrepancies.  Would attitudes with larger discrepancies also be 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  39 
 
less stable over time and more resistant to change?  These questions deserve further 
investigation.   
Final Thoughts 
The prevalence of actual-desired attitude discrepancies and the robustness of their 
association with subjective ambivalence might be surprising.  After all, people are free to change 
their evaluations at any moment.  That such discrepancies persist suggests limitations on 
people’s ability to control their evaluations (see also Wheeler et al., 2007).  Social constraints, 
reality constraints, consistency pressures, goal pursuit, and the like all induce potential conflict 
between one’s current evaluations and the ones that are most desired.  It might not be possible to 
ever eliminate such conflict entirely.  Instead, individuals might hold evaluations that trade off 
between these various intrapersonal and interpersonal pressures as best they can, resulting in 
continual evaluative tension that never fully dissipates.   
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  40 
 
References 
Abelson, R. P., & Rosenberg, M. J. (1958). Symbolic psychologic: A model of attitudinal 
cognition. Behavioral Science, 3, 1-13. doi: 10.1002/bs.3830030102 
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence: A test of three key hypotheses. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1421-1432. doi: 
10.1177/0146167200263009 
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic 
attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 893-912. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.893 
Bell, D. W., & Esses, V. M. (2002). Ambivalence and response amplification: A motivational 
perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1143-1152. doi: 
10.1177/01461672022811012 
Brehm, J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 384-389. 
Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2012). Knowing our attitudes and how to change them. In S. Vazire & 
T. D. Wilson (Eds.), Handbook of Self-knowledge (pp. 157-180). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & DeMarree, K. G. (2008).  Reducing subjective ambivalence by 
increasing doubt: A self-validation approach.  Presented at the European Association of 
Experimental Social Psychology General Meeting, Opatija, Croatia.   
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & McCaslin, M. J. (2009). Changing attitudes on implicit versus explicit 
measures:  What is the difference? In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio & P. Briñol (Eds.), 
Attitudes:  Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 285-326). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Wheeler, S. C. (2006). Discrepancies between explicit and implicit 
self-concepts:  Consequences for information processing. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 91, 154-170. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.154 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? . Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3-5. 
doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Cacioppo, J. T., Gardner, W. L., & Berntson, G. G. (1997). Beyond bipolar conceptualizations 
and measures:  The case of attitudes and evaluative space. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 1, 3-25. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0101_2 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. New York, NY: 
Cambridge Press. 
Cavazza, N., & Butera, F. (2008). Bending without breaking: Examining the role of attitudinal 
ambivalence in resisting persuasive communication. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 38, 1-15. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.424 
Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The 
development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 318-328. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.69.2.318 
Clark, J. K., Wegener, D. T., & Fabrigar, L. R. (2008). Attitudinal ambivalence and message-
based persuasion: Motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of 
counterattitudinal information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 565-577. 
doi: 10.1177/0146167207312527 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  41 
 
Clarkson, J. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2008). A new look at the consequences of 
attitude certainty: The amplification hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 95, 810-825. doi: 10.1037/a0013192 
Conner, M., & Armitage, C. J. (2008). Attitudinal ambivalence. In W. D. Crano & R. Prislin 
(Eds.), Attitudes and attitude change (pp. 261-286). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Conner, M., Sparks, P., Povey, R., James, R., Shepherd, R., & Armitage, C. J. (2002). Moderator 
effects of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-behaviour relationships. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 32, 705-718. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.117 
de Liver, Y., van der Pligt, J., & Wigboldus, D. (2007). Positive and negative associations 
underlying ambivalent attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 319-
326. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.02.012 
DeMarree, K. G., Morrison, K. R., Wheeler, S. C., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Self-ambivalence and 
resistance to subtle self-change attempts. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 
674-686. doi: 10.1177/0146167211400097 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1995). Attitude strength, attitude structure, and resistance to 
change. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and 
consequences (pp. 413-432). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Edwards, J. R. (1994). The study of congruence in organizational behavior research: Critique and 
a proposed alternative. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, 51-
100. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1994.1029 
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, 
and correlates of attitude accessibility. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude 
strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 247-282). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (in press). The MODE model: Attitude-behavior processes as a 
function of motivation and opportunity. In J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski & Y. Trope 
(Eds.), Dual process theories of the social mind. New York, NY: Guilford. 
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit on 
automatic evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 557-572. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.557 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-140. 
doi: 10.1177/001872675400700202 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Forer, B. R. (1949). The fallacy of personal validation: A classroom demonstration of gullibility. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44, 118-123. doi: 10.1037/h0059240 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Accessibility from active and fulfilled goals. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 220-239. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.06.009 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five 
personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528. doi: 
10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1 
Haddock, G. (2003). Making a party leader less of a party member: The impact of ambivalence 
on assimilation and contrast effects in political party attitudes. Political Psychology, 24, 
769-780. doi: 10.1046/j.1467-9221.2003.00353.x 
Hajda, J. (1968). Ambivalence and social relations. Sociological Focus, 2, 21-28.  
Hart, W., Albarracin, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M. J., & Merrill, L. (2009). Feeling 
validated versus being correct: A meta-analysis of selective exposure to information. 
Psychological Bulletin, 135, 555-588. doi: 10.1037/a0015701 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  42 
 
Hass, R. G., Katz, I., Rizzo, N., Bailey, J., & Moore, L. (1992). When racial ambivalence evokes 
negative affect, using a disguised measure of mood. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 18, 786-797. doi: 10.1177/0146167292186015 
Hayes, A. F. (2006). A primer on multilevel modeling. Human Communication Research, 32, 
385-410. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.2006.00281.x 
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 
94, 319-340. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319 
Higgins, E. T. (1989). Self-discrepancy theory: What patterns of self-beliefs cause people to 
suffer? In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 22, pp. 
93-136). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Jonas, K., Diehl, M., & Bromer, P. (1997). Effects of attitudinal ambivalence on information 
processing and attitude-intention consistency. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 33, 190-210. doi: 10.1006/jesp.1996.1317 
Kaplan, K. J. (1972). On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory and 
measurement: A suggested modification of the semantic differential technique. 
Psychological Bulletin, 77, 361-372. doi: 10.1037/h0032590 
Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational 
and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 55, 893-905. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.893 
Kenny, D. A., Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., Livi, S., & Kashy, D. A. (2002). The statistical analysis 
of data from small groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 126-137. 
doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.1.126 
Koo, M., & Fishbach, A. (2008). Dynamics of self-regulation: How (un)accomplished goal 
actions affect motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 183-195. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.183 
Krosnick, J. A., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Attitude strength: An overview. In R. E. Petty & J. A. 
Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 1-24). Mahwah, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Larsen, J. T., Norris, C. J., McGraw, A. P., Hawkley, L. C., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2009). The 
evaluative space grid: A single-item measure of positivity and negativity. Cognition and 
Emotion, 23. doi: 10.1080/02699930801994054 
Lavine, H. (2001). The electoral consequences of ambivalence toward presidential candidates. 
American Journal of Political Science, 45, 915-929. doi: 10.2307/2669332 
Maio, G. R., Bell, D. C., & Esses, V. M. (1996). Ambivalence and persuasion: The processing of 
messages about immigrant groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 513-
536. doi: 10.1006/jesp.1996.0023 
Maio, G. R., & Thomas, G. (2007). The Epistemic-Teleologic Model of deliberate self-
persuasion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 46-67. doi: 
10.1177/1088868306294589 
Markus, H. R., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41, 954-969. doi: 
10.1037/0003-066X.41.9.954 
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (1998-2011). Mplus User's Guide. Sixth Edition. Los Angeles, 
CA: Muthén & Muthén. 
Newby-Clark, I. R., McGregor, I., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Thinking and caring about cognitive 
inconsistency: When and for whom does attitudinal ambivalence feel uncomfortable? 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  43 
 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 157-166. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.82.2.157 
Newcomb, T. M. (1961). The acquaintance process. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Newcomb, T. M. (1968). Interpersonal balance. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. 
M. Newcomb, M. Rosenberg & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive 
consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 28-51). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. 
Nordgren, L. F., van Harreveld, F., & van der Pligt, J. (2006). Ambivalence, discomfort, and 
motivated information processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 252-
258. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.004 
Osgood, C. E., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1955). The principle of congruity in the prediction of 
attitude change. Psychological Review, 62, 42-55. doi: 10.1037/h0048153 
Otnes, C., Lowrey, T. M., & Shrum, L. J. (1997). Toward an understanding of consumer 
ambivalence. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 80-93. doi: 10.1086/209495 
Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2009).  Implicit ambivalence: A meta-cognitive approach.  In R. E. 
Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.).  Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures  
(pp. 119-164). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2007). The Meta-Cognitive Model (MCM) of 
attitudes: Implications for attitude measurement, change, and strength. Social Cognition, 
25, 657-686. doi: 10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.657 
Petty, R. E., & Krosnick, J. A. (1995). Attitude strength:  Antecedents and consequences. 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Briñol, P., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (2006). Implicit ambivalence from 
attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 21-41. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.21 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 
879-891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879 
Preacher, K. J., Zyphur, M. J., & Zhang, Z. (2010). A general multilevel SEM framework for 
assessing multilevel mediation. Psychological Methods, 15, 209-233. doi: 
10.1037/a0020141 
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (1996). The gradual threshold model of ambivalence: Relating the 
positive and negative bases of attitudes to subjective ambivalence. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 71, 431-449. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.431 
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (2001). Extending the bases of subjective attitudinal ambivalence: 
Interpersonal and intrapersonal antecedents of evaluative tension. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 80, 19-34. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.80.1.19 
Priester, J. R., Petty, R. E., & Park, K. (2007). Whence univalent ambivalence? From the 
anticipation of conflicting reactions. Journal of Consumer Research, 34, 11-21. doi: 
10.1086/513042 
Rosenzweig, S. (1938). The definition of ambivalence. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 
17, 223-226.  
Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2004). When resistance is futile: Consequences of failed 
counterarguing for attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 
219-235. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.219 
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2008). Consequences of discrepant explicit 
and implicit attitudes: Cognitive dissonance and increased information processing. 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  44 
 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1526-1532. doi: 
10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.006 
Rudolph, T. J., & Popp, E. (2007). An information processing theory of ambivalence. Political 
Psychology, 28, 563-585. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00590.x 
Sawicki, V., Wegener, D. T., Clark, J. K., Fabrigar, L. R., Smith, S. M., & Durso, G. R. O. (2013). 
Feeling conflicted and seeking information: When ambivalence enhances and diminishes 
selective exposure to attitude-consistent information. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 39(6), 735-747. doi: 10.1177/0146167213481388 
Schneider, I. K., Eerland, A., van Harreveld, F., Rotteveel, M., van der Pligt, J., van der Stoep, N., & 
Zwaan, R. A. (2013). One way and the other: The bidirectional relationship between 
ambivalence and body movement. Psychological Science, 24, 319-325.  
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. American Psychologist, 
54, 93-105. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.54.2.93 
Scott, W. A. (1969).  Structure of natural cognitions.  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 12, 261-278.  doi: 10.1037/h0027734 
Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: On the antecedents 
and consequences of goal shielding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 
1261-1280. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1261 
Shah, J. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). When opportunity knocks: Bottom-up priming of goals 
by means and its effects on self-regulation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84, 1109-1122. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1109 
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New 
procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7, 422-445. doi: 
10.1037//1082-989X.7.4.422 
Sparks, P., Harris, P. R., & Lockwood, N. (2004). Predictors and predictive effects of 
ambivalence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 371-383. doi: 
10.1348/0144666042037980 
Thompson, M. M., & Zanna, M. P. (1995). The conflicted individual: Personality-based and 
domain specific antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes. Journal of Personality, 63, 
259-288. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1995.tb00810.x 
Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., & Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let's not be indifferent about 
(attitudinal) ambivalence. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: 
Antecedents and consequences (pp. 361-386). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2002). What doesn't kill me makes me stronger: The effects of 
resisting persuasion on attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
83, 1298-1313. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1298 
Tourangeau, R., Rasinski, K. A., Bradburn, N., & D'Andrade, R. (1989). Carryover effects in 
attitude surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly, 53, 495-524. doi: 10.1086/269169 
van Harreveld, F., Rutjens, B. T., Rotteveel, M., Nordgren, L. F., & van der Pligt, J. (2009). 
Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: Feeling 
tense before jumping off the fence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 167-
173. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.08.015 
van Harreveld, F., van der Pligt, J., & de Liver, Y. N. (2009). The agony of ambivalence and 
ways to resolve it: Introducing the MAID model. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 13, 45-61. doi: 10.1177/1088868308324518 
ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES  45 
 
Visser, P. S., & Krosnick, J. A. (1998). Development of attitude strength over the life cycle: 
Surge and decline. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1389-1410. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.75.6.1389 
Wheeler, S. C., Briñol, P., & Hermann, A. D. (2007). Resistance to persuasion as self-regulation: 
Ego-depletion and its effects on attitude change processes. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 43, 150-156. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.01.001 
Willard, G., & Gramzow, R. H. (2009). Beyond oversights, lies, and pies in the sky: 
Exaggeration as goal projection. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 477-
492. doi: 10.1177/0146167208329631 
Zhao, X., & Cai, X. (2008). The role of ambivalence in college nonsmokers' information seeking 
and information processing. Communication Research, 35, 298-318. doi: 
10.1177/0093650208315959 
Running head: ACTUAL-DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES 46 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for Study 3 measured variables. 
    Attitude (SD) 
Object SA (SD) OA (SD)  Actual Ideal Ought Desired 
African Americans 3.29 (2.29) 1.01 (3.62)  2.26 (1.89) 3.19 (1.29) 3.37 (1.20) 3.28 (1.19) 
Hillary Clinton 4.06 (2.35) 1.18 (2.90)  -.54 (2.28) -.19 (2.44) -.29 (2.20) -.24 (2.15) 
John McCain 4.34 (2.45) .73 (2.63)  .03 (2.31) .29 (2.43) .47 (2.34) .38 (2.28) 
Abortion 3.91 (2.55) .18 (3.29)  .18 (2.97) .22 (2.89) -.48 (2.95) -.13 (2.80) 
Exercising 2.48 (2.05) -1.41 (2.88)  2.97 (1.59) 3.74 (.73) 3.75 (.76) 3.75 (.72) 
Gay marriage 3.49 (2.49) -.48 (3.00)  .51 (2.95) 1.03 (2.91) .87 (3.00) .95 (2.82) 
Iraq war 4.57 (2.66) .20 (3.23)  -1.47 (2.53) -.63 (2.89) -.34 (2.89) -.49 (2.78) 
Self 4.11 (2.49) .96 (3.26)  2.58 (1.46) 3.75 (.74) 3.80 (.64) 3.78 (.66) 
Using condoms 2.50 (2.04) .01 (3.99)  2.63 (1.86) 3.24 (1.48) 3.10 (1.61) 3.17 (1.44) 
Walmart 3.45 (2.26) 1.62 (3.25)  .83 (2.28) .48 (2.39) .23 (2.49) .35 (2.33) 
Across all objects 3.62 (2.46) .40 (3.32)  1.00 (2.68) 1.51 (2.74) 1.45 (2.78) 1.48 (2.68) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Study 2 calculated variables. 
 
 Discrepancy 
Presence 
 Discrepancy Magnitude  Discrepancy 
Direction 
 Same Valence 
Object Ide 
 
Oug Des  Ide Oug Des  Ide Oug Des  Ide Oug Des 
African Americans 50.1 54.3 52.4  0.99 (1.37) 1.19 (1.59) 1.07 (1.45)  96.2 94.7 96.4  79.2 78.9 80.0 
Hillary Clinton 48.6 59.0 62.9  0.92 (1.19) 1.21 (1.36) 0.96 (1.04)  64.7 59.7 62.1  39.2 33.9 56.1 
John McCain 46.7 50.5 54.3  0.85 (1.16) 1.05 (1.38) 0.90 (1.11)  59.2 64.2 63.2  46.9 39.6 47.4 
Abortion 39.0 45.7 48.6  0.72 (1.29) 1.11 (1.56) 0.86 (1.18)  41.5 25.0 29.4  51.2 45.8 52.9 
Exercising 36.2 38.1 39.0  0.81 (1.36) 0.84 (1.34) 0.82 (1.34)  94.7 95.0 92.7  84.2 85.0 85.4 
Gay marriage 35.2 43.8 45.7  0.80 (1.29) 1.19 (1.77) 0.94 (1.31)  78.4 69.6 77.1  43.2 34.8 50.0 
Iraq war 52.4 58.1 59.0  1.23 (1.58) 1.56 (1.91) 1.34 (1.62)  76.4 73.8 74.2  36.4 39.3 48.4 
Self 65.7 62.9 66.7  1.23 (1.34) 1.24 (1.38) 1.23 (1.34)  97.1 98.5 97.1  89.9 90.9 91.4 
Using condoms 41.0 39.0 43.8  0.91 (1.47) 0.96 (1.60) 0.89 (1.46)  79.1 75.6 76.1  58.1 56.1 63.0 
Walmart 53.5 57.1 54.3  1.02 (1.29) 1.50 (1.75) 1.18 (1.44)  28.6 33.3 29.8  50.0 33.3 45.6 
Across all objects 46.9 50.9 52.7  0.95 (1.34) 1.18 (1.58) 1.02 (1.35)  72.0 68.9 69.8  58.7 53.6 62.0 
 
Discrepancy direction = percentage of people who have a discrepancy who want to be more positive. 
Same valence = percentage of people who have a discrepancy whose desired attitude is of the same valence as their actual attitude. 
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Table 3: Average correlations between Study 2 variables.   
 SA OA Actual Ideal Ought Desired Act-Ideal Act-Ought 
SA         
OA 0.50 (0.11)        
Actual -0.18 (0.38) -0.07 (0.34)       
Ideal -0.06 (0.30) -0.01 (0.31) 0.70 (0.18)      
Ought -0.10 (0.28) -0.05 (0.29) 0.60 (0.16) 0.81 (0.05)     
Desired -0.08 (0.31) -0.03 (0.31) 0.68 (0.17) 0.95 (0.01) 0.95 (0.01)    
Act-Ideal 0.36 (0.18) 0.31 (0.09) -0.39 (0.39) 0.05 (0.20) -0.02 (0.23) 0.01 (0.23)   
Act-Ought 0.30 (0.19) 0.23 (0.11) -0.37 (0.40) -0.06 (0.17) -0.02 (0.28) -0.04 (0.22) 0.70 (0.21)  
Act-Desired 0.33 (0.20) 0.27 (0.08) -0.40 (0.39) -0.01 (0.18) -0.02 (0.26) -0.02 (0.22) 0.89 (0.08) 0.91 (0.07) 
Note:  To control for the non-independence of the 10 observations nested within each participant, the correlations were computed 
within each object, this table contains the mean values across attitude objects with the associated standard deviation.  Significance was 
determined based on a t-test against 0, with 9 degrees of freedom.  Values in bold differ from 0 at p < .05, values in italics differ from 
0 at p < .10. 
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Figure 1: Subjective ambivalence as a function of actual and desired attitude, controlling for 
objective ambivalence (Study 2).  Top panel is +/- 1SD from sample means, whereas bottom 
panel is +/- 1SD from scale midpoints.   
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Figure 2: Intentions to exercise as a function of exercise attitudes, actual-desired attitude 
discrepancies, and objective ambivalence (Study 5). 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 In several ways, ambivalence is related to dissonance (see e.g., Festinger, 1957; Rydell, 
McConnell & Mackie, 2008).  That is, both involve inconsistent mental representations, which 
can create aversive feelings that people are motivated to reduce.  However, attitudes researchers 
typically have distinguished between these two constructs (see e.g., van Harreveld, van der Pligt, 
& de Liver, 2009).  For example, whereas dissonance typically arises after one has committed to 
a specific choice, ambivalence occurs to the greatest extent prior to making a choice (van 
Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009).  As such, ambivalence is likely 
to impact judgments that are inputs into choices.  Of course, in some cases, such as in a 
spreading of alternatives paradigm (see e.g., Brehm, 1956), ambivalence towards either object 
before making a choice can serve as the fodder for dissonance creation once the choice is made 
(e.g., the negative component of one’s attitude towards the chosen alternative creates dissonance 
– “I chose the Celine Dion CD, even though the third and fourth tracks annoy me”).  
2 In this and all other studies, parallel results were obtained when other ambivalence formulae 
were used.  This is not surprising, as the various formulae tend to be very highly correlated with 
each other (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1996). 
3 An alternative way to compute this term would be to average actual-ideal and actual ought 
discrepancies.  Such an approach would not allow us to examine direction of discrepancies, as 
not all actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies are in the same direction.  Averaging the two 
discrepancies of people with oppositely valenced ideal and ought attitudes would make people 
appear less conflicted in the metric we used than in this alternate metric. In the current samples, 
the two approaches to creating a general discrepancy measure (actual-desired discrepancies and 
average of actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies) were very strongly correlated (i.e., rs > 
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.92) and therefore produced identical effects (this is not surprising, as actual-ideal and actual-
ought discrepancies were highly correlated as well, rs = .45-.96, median r = .73).  Thus, we 
report the actual-desired discrepancies, so that we can follow-up with analyses examining 
direction of discrepancy, but caution against doing so when ideal and ought attitudes exert 
conflicting influences on a person’s attitude.   
In support of our current approach, we ran an additional study, with 107 Stanford 
University students (31 males, 76 females) as participants, to examine the relationship between 
generic “desired” attitudes (as assessed in Study 4) and ideal and ought attitudes.  In this study, 
we separately assessed actual, ideal, and ought attitudes towards capital punishment using the 
same approach as in Study 2, with the addition of a generic “desired” attitude item as in Study 4.   
We then predicted this desired attitude item from ideal and ought attitudes in regression.  Both 
ideal (b = .63), t(104) = 9.33, p < .001, and ought (b = .28), t(104) = 4.05, p < .001, attitudes 
predicted desired attitudes, Adj. R2 = .72, indicating that both ideal and ought attitudes contribute 
to desired attitudes.  Because of this, it is no surprise that in all studies that operationalized 
desired attitudes as the average of ideal and ought attitudes parallel results were obtained across 
measures.  
4 There was a marginal (p = .08) effect using ideal attitudes as the form of desired attitudes, such 
that people who ideally wanted a more positive attitude tended to experience greater 
ambivalence as actual-ideal discrepancy magnitude increased.  
